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InTroduCTIon
Timeliness, the period of limitation for bringing claims in arbitra-
tion, is often raised as a defense either in arbitration proceedings or 
in court. Being a condition precedent to arbitration, it is often unclear 
whether timeliness is in itself arbitrable. Such lack of clarity bolsters the 
accrual of uncertainties as to whom of the tribunal or the court should 
determine the outcome of a question.
In determining the arbitrability of an issue, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has generally held that the question turns upon what the parties agreed 
about that specific matter.2 Therefore, whether an issue is to be decided 
by the arbitrator or a court is ultimately a matter of the parties’ contrac-
tual intent3 and parties are required to submit to arbitration only those 
disputes they have agreed to be arbitrable.4
In practice however, parties many times fail to include express pro-
visions regarding limitations issues in the arbitration agreement, notably 
1 American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidates 2013.
2 Specifically, the question is the following: did the parties agree to submit the 
arbitrability question itself to arbitration? First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
3 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995).
4 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 947 (holding that because one party did not clearly 
agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the issue was subject to 
review by courts).
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timeliness. Thus, a court faced with a motion to compel or stay arbitra-
tion must determine who the parties intended to decide such issues. 
Today, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties as to 
the arbitrability of pre-arbitration issues, resolution of the “who decides” 
issue may ultimately depend on which federal court is making the deter-
mination. Circuit courts are split as to who should resolve the timeliness 
question.5 Traditionally, in the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth 
circuits, the trend had been that the arbitrator would decide matters 
of timeliness, at least when governed by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers rule (hereinafter “NASD”).6 On the other hand, the 
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits decided that, under 
the NASD rule, courts should determine timeliness.7
In 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that put to rest the 
interpretation of timeliness in the context of the NASD rule—but it 
was unclear how the courts would interpret it with regards to arbitra-
tion clauses outside the NASD’s realm.8 Today, there is still dissonance 
among the courts on how to approach the issue.9 In Bechtel v. UEG 
Araucária,10 the most recent decision addressing the arbitrability of 
timeliness, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided 
that the question was for the arbitrators, not courts, to decide. However, 
because that decision was not based on Supreme Court precedent, the 
issue of timeliness in non-NASD context still remains unresolved in 
other circuits.
This Article will examine developments in American jurisprudence 
as to arbitral timeliness and attempt to reconcile each court’s approach 
to that issue. Part I will provide the historical context of timeliness as 
a procedural or substantive arbitrability issue. Part II will discuss the 
current trend towards timeliness as a procedural issue. Finally, Part III 
argues that federal courts should adopt the current trend of addressing 
timeliness as a procedural issue to be settled by the arbitrator in order to 
preserve the sanctity of the arbitration process.
5 Lawrence W. Newman, Charles M. Davidson, Arbitrability of Timeliness 
Defenses: Who Decides? 14 J. Int’l Arb. 137, 138 (1997).
6 Id. at 142.
7 These courts considered timeliness a component of arbitrability. Id. at 141.
8 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
9 However, some courts have tried to reconcile these constructions across provisions 
regarding choice of law.
10 Bechtel do Brasil v. UEG Araucária, 638 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2011).
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I. Is Timeliness an Issue of Procedural or Substantive 
Arbitrability?
The tension between submitting the interpretation of time-barred 
claims to arbitrators or the courts mired many of the arbitration disputes 
leading up to Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.11 Traditionally, the 
Federal Circuit Courts have held that timeliness is an issue of substan-
tive arbitrability to be decided by the courts. In Howsam however, the 
Supreme Court established a new presumption that issues regarding the 
timeliness of a claim should be submitted to the arbitration tribunal—
absent some provision indicating otherwise.12
A. Traditional Judicial Approach to Timeliness as a 
Substantive Arbitrability Issue
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have tradi-
tionally treated timeliness as an issue of substantive arbitrability and 
thus as a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be satisfied for a dispute 
to be eligible for arbitration.13 These Circuits have held that the courts, 
instead of arbitrators, must determine arbitrability in the first instance.14 
To determine the arbitrability of an issue, these jurisdictions ask whether 
the agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular 
grievance, which ultimately turns on an interpretation of the parties’ 
intent.15 Courts have typically engaged in a two-step analysis to resolve 
this question.16
First, under the Supreme Court precedent AT&T Technologies, Inc. 
v. Communications Workers of America, the issue of whether the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate their dispute is for the courts to decide.17 The 
Court in AT&T Technologies, Inc., reasoned that because arbitration 
11 Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 137.
12 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
13 Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F. 3d 381, 383-84 
(11th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Roney and Co. v. Kassab, 981 F. 2d 894, 898 (6th Cir. 1992); Edward D. Jones & Co. 
v. Sorrells, 957 F. 2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1992).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 139.
17 See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) 
(“Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).
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is a matter of contract, parties could only submit to arbitration those 
disputes that both parties have agreed to be arbitrated.18 Courts should 
hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on who should decide arbitra-
bility as giving the arbitrators that power, for “doing so might too often 
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have 
thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.”19
Second, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have 
examined the arbitration provisions to determine whether there is “clear 
and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’ intent to arbitrate the time-
bar issue.20 In instances where the arbitration clauses’ language was 
ambiguous (i.e. where the clause failed to expressly allocate to the arbi-
trators the determination of statute of limitations defenses), these courts 
have generally held that clear and unmistakable evidence of such intent 
to arbitrate was absent and that the issue of timeliness thus belonged to 
the court.21
The Tenth Circuit in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch accordingly held 
that it was the district court, and not the arbitrator, who had jurisdiction 
to determine whether the parties’ claims were time-barred by §15 of the 
NASD Code.22 After finding that there was not a “clear and unmistak-
able” expression of the parties’ intent to give the arbitrator the power to 
decide whether § 15 bars it from exercising jurisdiction,23 the court held 
that it could not compel arbitration because more than six years had 
elapsed, causing the claim to be time-barred.24
The courts in the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits 
reconciled their decision of timeliness as a judicial determination with 
18 See id. (“The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission 
to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining 
agreement does in fact create such a duty.”).
19 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
20 E.g., Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 
(10th Cir. 1996) (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 945).
21 Id. at 478 (“If we conclude the agreement is silent, ambiguous, or devoid of 
“clear and unmistakable” evidence the parties intended the arbitrators to determine the 
applicability of § 15 of the NASD Code, we must conclude the parties intended for the 
court to decide whether it applies”).
22 Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478.
23 Id. at 481 (holding that the plaintiff had not identified any evidence tending to 
show the clear and unmistakable intent of the parties to have the arbitrator decide the 
issue of timeliness).
24 Id.
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other circuits holding that arbitrators should decide by applying the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc.:
Courts should not assume that the parties agreed 
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so. . . . In this 
manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the 
question “who (primarily) should decide arbitrability” 
differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity 
about the question “whether a particular merits-related 
dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a 
valid arbitration agreement,-for in respect to this latter 
question the law reverses the presumption.”25
The Supreme Court has held that “due regard must be given to the 
federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of 
the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.”26 However, 
this presumption in favor of arbitration is not applicable when the ques-
tion to be resolved is who decides the arbitrability question itself.27
B. Recent Judicial Approach to Timeliness as a Procedural 
Issue: the Howsam and Bechtel decisions
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court opted 
to treat timeliness as a procedural issue reserved for the determination of 
the arbitrators.28 The case involved claims arising from a dispute between 
a private investor, Howsam, and Dean Witter, the brokerage firm that 
had provided her financial advice.29 In particular, Howsam claimed that 
the firm had misrepresented the economic value of the partnerships she 
was told to invest in.30 The dispute continued and Howsam eventually 
opted for arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(hereinafter “NASD”) under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 
(hereinafter “NASD Code”).31 The issue arose when Dean Witter sought 
a declaration in Federal District Court that arbitration was no longer 
25 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
26 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (U.S.N.C. 
1983).
27 Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 476 (1989).
28 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
29 Id. at 81.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 82.
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feasible because the dispute accrued more than six years before the 
initiation of arbitration—thus rendering the entire arbitral proceedings 
time-barred under Section 10304 of the applicable NASD Code.32 Indeed, 
Section 10304 provides that no dispute “shall be eligible for submission 
. . . where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving 
rise to the dispute.”33 The district court dismissed the action, finding that 
courts had no jurisdiction to interpret the NASD Code. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court and held 
that the parties had not clearly and unmistakably allocated the issue of 
arbitrability itself to the arbitrators.34 Thus, because the Court found that 
the determination of whether the arbitration was time-barred inherently 
affected the dispute’s arbitrability, it also ruled that the issue was within 
the primary jurisdiction of the courts as the parties had not expressly and 
unequivocally allocated the question to the tribunal.35
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the 
Tenth Circuit, reasoning that as a question inherently procedural in 
nature, timeliness was for the strict determination of the arbitrators.36 
The Court’s rationale stressed that the timeliness of the arbitration was 
a procedural condition precedent to arbitration that did not involve a 
decision of whether the parties were bound by the arbitration clause of 
their agreement.37 Rather, the time limit rule “closely resembles” gate-
way questions that the Court has not found to be questions of arbitrabil-
ity38 and that are inherently part of the dispute itself, to be determined 
by the tribunal. In reaching its conclusion, the Court also considered 
that requiring the timeliness issue to be determined by the courts would 
delay and antagonize the purpose of arbitration clauses in the first place: 
mechanisms that bypass the court system to provide quick and effective 
remedies.39 Finally, the Court emphasized that because NASD arbitra-
tors are more experienced, they are more apt to interpret and apply their 
own timeliness rule.40
32 Id.
33 NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10304 (1984).
34 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2001), rev’d. 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
35 Id.
36 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 85.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 85.
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In spite of the Court’s clear ruling in Howsam, the federal circuits 
are still divided on the issue of the arbitrability of timeliness, some 
questioning the precedential value of the decision, which was rendered 
in the NASD context. Thus, the decisions that elected to follow the pro-
cedural approach remain particularly relevant to understand the import 
of Howsam. In 2011, in Bechtel v. UEG Araucária, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the issue was one for the arbi-
trators, not the courts to decide.41 Although the Bechtel decision sprung 
from a jurisdiction that has traditionally viewed questions of timeliness 
as the type that should be submitted to the arbitrator, this decision could 
highlight the shift initiated by Howsam towards time-bars as a procedural 
issue of arbitrability.42 In Bechtel, Bechtel do Brasil, Bechtel Canada, and 
Bechtel International (“Bechtel”) had entered in 2000 into an agreement 
with UEG Araucária (“UEGA”) for services regarding the construction 
of a power plant in Araucária, Brazil.43 The agreement, construed together 
with governing—procedural and substantive—law provisions indicated 
that the parties intended to submit disputes arising from the breach or 
execution of their contract to arbitration.44 Additionally, the agreement 
provided that its provisions should be interpreted under New York law.45
In late 2002, Bechtel completed its construction and examination 
of the power plant and notified UEGA.46 UEGA certified its acceptance 
of the power plant, but due to extraneous circumstances, did not start 
41 Bechtel do Brasil v. UEG Araucária, 638 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).
42 Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 142.
43 Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 152.
44 Art. 37.2. of the Contract read: “Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising 
out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach, termination or validity thereof . . . 
shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation 
and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”) then in 
effect (the “Rules”), except as these rules may be modified herein.” Art. 37.2.2 read: 
“Any arbitration proceeding or award rendered hereunder and the validity, effect and 
interpretation of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the laws of the state 
of New York.” The Contract also contained a “Law and Procedure” section specifying 
that “The law which is to apply to the Contract and under which the Contract is to 
be construed is the law of the state of New York without regard to the jurisdiction’s 
conflicts of laws rules” and “the law governing the procedure and administration of 
any arbitration instituted pursuant to Clause 37 is the law of the State of New York.” 
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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operating the power plant until December 2006.47 In 2008, one of the 
mechanical components of the power plant failed, and UEGA filed for 
arbitration based on a claim of deficiency in Bechtel’s services and for 
negligent misrepresentation.48 Bechtel asserted the defense that UEGA’s 
claim was time-barred and therefore could not be asserted in arbitration. 
Bechtel based this defense on a New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
provision which states:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made 
or notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim 
sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limita-
tion of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a 
party may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration 
on an application to the court.49
As a result, the issue of arbitrability of the timeliness of a claim 
came before the courts.50 The district court determined that arbitration 
should be permanently stayed because UEGA asserted its claim after 
the time-bar in New York, which prevented it from compelling Bechtel 
to submit to arbitration.51 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed the decision and ordered that the question of 
timeliness be submitted to the arbitrator—not the court. The reversal 
was motivated by the Court’s reasoning that the arbitrator would have 
to decide the issue of whether an arbitration claim was time-barred,52 as 
the issue of when the limitation time starts to run constitutes an element 
of the dispute that cannot be separated from the rest of the arbitration 
claims.
Although Bechtel did not cite to Supreme Court precedent in reach-
ing its ruling, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Howsam is particularly 
useful in analyzing Bechtel. Indeed, both cases are similar in that they 
involve disputes regarding the terms of a time-provision not explicitly 
included in those terms. Second, although Howsam specifically impli-
cates a NASD rule—and Bechtel does not—the timeliness issues are 
both determinative of the arbitrator’s ability to rule on the matter. Third, 
as in Howsam, the parties in Bechtel agreed prior to the dispute to submit 
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7502(b). 
50 Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 152.
51 Id. at 153-54.
52 Id. at 152.
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all claims to arbitration.53 This means that, according to the executed 
agreement, the parties in Bechtel did not intend to reserve a special 
exception for timeliness to be submitted to the court.54 Moreover, the 
decision to include an arbitration clause reflected the parties’ interest in 
the efficient resolution of any potential disputes, as the Court described 
in Howsam.55 For these reasons, the Bechtel decision further supports 
the assertion laid out in Howsam, that issues regarding the timeliness of 
claims should be submitted to the arbitrator as a procedural condition 
precedent to arbitration, rather than a substantive question of arbitrabil-
ity beyond the arbitrators’ reach.
II. The Judicial Shift Towards Framing the Issue of Timeliness as 
One of Procedural Arbitrability
Until recently, various circuit courts approached questions regard-
ing the arbitrability of timeliness claims differently.56 Since Howsam 
however, the presumption of submitting claims of timeliness to the 
arbitrator seems to be finally somewhat influencing the approaches of 
the various Federal circuits.
Although the courts have indicated in the past that they “do not 
establish a bright line rule that timeliness questions must inexorably go 
to the arbitrator,”57 circuit courts now seem to look for contractual pro-
visions granting jurisdiction to the court over time-bar issues.58 In the 
absence of such contractual provisions, the courts appear to be allowing 
the claims to go through the arbitration procedure. This reflects both the 
presumption outlined in Howsam with regards to the specific NASD 
rule, but also places emphasis on the parties’ ultimate decision to arbi-
trate.59 By leaving open the option of contracting otherwise, the courts 
seem to sidestep the issue of a de facto bar on timeliness claims, and 
establish a more predictable structure that would allow parties to enter 
contracts with more certainty of being able to avoid excessive litigation 
costs.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
56 Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 141-42.
57 United Steel Workers of America v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 505 
F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2007).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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One of the more prominent cases following Howsam, United Steel 
Workers of America v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., involved 
a labor dispute between the United Steel Workers of America and a 
manufacturing company.60 The case employed the Howsam presump-
tion structure and indicates explicitly in dicta that “parties who wish to 
steer timeliness disputes to the courts remain free to do so and nothing 
in this opinion is to the contrary.”61 The parties in this case however, 
were silent on the issue of timeliness when they established the arbi-
tration procedure to resolve their grievances. Through this ruling the 
presumption outlined by the Supreme Court in Howsam was extended 
to the timeliness claims in other arbitration disputes—ones that do not 
necessarily implicate the NASD rule.62
This development is a stark departure from the previous approach 
that the Sixth Circuit had taken on issues of arbitrability. The Sixth 
Circuit, along with the Third, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits 
traditionally submitted claims to the courts for determination on the 
timeliness issue.63 Although the Sixth Circuit has not expressed a prohi-
bition on submitting such claims to the courts, it becomes an exception 
that must have been clearly outlined by the parties. The presumption 
requires the contracting party seeking court assistance to rebut the 
notion that the issue of timeliness should be submitted to the arbitrator. 
The court in the United Steel Workers case based this determination on 
the notion that:
[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues 
of substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court to decide 
and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e. whether pre-
requisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppels, 
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbi-
trate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide.”64
By grounding its decision in the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 
the court further bolsters its approach to timeliness as a procedural 
issue and indicates an authentic and authoritative source on practices 
60 Id. at 417.
61 Id. at 424.
62 Id. at 425.
63 Newman & Davidson, supra note 5 at 141.
64 United Steel Workers of America, 505 F.3d at 424 (citing RUAA sec. 6 cmt. 2, 
ULA at 13).
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and procedures in arbitration.65 Consequently, the Sixth circuit’s shift in 
approach can be said to indicate the growing trend to abandon timeli-
ness as a question of arbitrability and instead focusing on timeliness as 
a question of procedure.
III. Why Timeliness as a Procedural Arbitrability Issue Preserves 
The Effectiveness of the Arbitral Process
The trend towards approaching timeliness as procedural arbitrabil-
ity is consistent with the international endorsement of the arbitration 
process. As a procedural issue, time-bar defenses are directed to arbi-
trators to resolve, thereby deferring to arbitration questions that would 
otherwise be litigated in courts. In the international context, arbitration 
is a flexible form of alternate dispute resolution meant to benefit all par-
ties to a contract. The objective of arbitration is to eliminate some of the 
costs associated with traditional litigation while expediting the resolu-
tion to a claim. When parties enter litigation to determine the timeliness 
of a claim as an eligibility issue, they effectively eliminate the advan-
tages of an arbitration clause. The cost-savings and efficiencies that are 
the pinnacle of the arbitration process are countered by the litigation 
delays and costs of a court determining whether a claim is arbitrable. 
Furthermore, procedural issues are intertwined with the merits of the 
dispute, thus, reservation of procedural issues for the courts provides 
opportunity for inefficiencies that stem from duplication of efforts.
A jurisdictional characterization of timeliness shifts the author-
ity to determine the scope of arbitrators’ power from the arbitrators 
themselves to the court. Deference to the courts to resolve timeliness 
defenses establishes precedent for the courts to decide on other limita-
tion defenses. Such precedent threatens the sanctity of the arbitration 
process, as it exponentially expands the power of courts to stay arbitra-
tion proceedings. The current trend towards deferring time-bar defenses 
to arbitrators can preserve the sanctity of the arbitration process by 
increasing court predictability. Once parties are aware that the courts 
will defer time-bar defenses to arbitrators, they are able to forgo costly 
litigation in favor of arbitration to settle such claims.
65 Id.
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ConClusIon
The Supreme Court in Howsam held that arbitrators should decide 
the issue of timeliness.66 However, that decision was rendered in the 
narrow context of the NASD Code, which differs from other arbitral 
codes. In instances in which parties have agreed that the arbitration is 
to be governed by rules containing limitations, timeliness provisions 
could be treated as evidence of the parties’ intent regarding the arbitra-
bility of those limitations. Otherwise, there may still be a question as 
to their intent regarding the determination of limitations to arbitration. 
Resolving the issue of whether the arbitrator or the courts decide on 
whether a claim is timely ultimately turns on the parties’ intent—or the 
lack thereof. Although parties to a contract are free to vest the arbitra-
tors with the power to determine issues of arbitrability, parties often 
either fail to foresee this issue or to make their intent clear.
Absent a clear expression of the parties’ intent, courts may engage 
in varied analyses to reach different and unpredictable results. The 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate under rules containing limitations provi-
sions may or may not be construed as evidence of their intent to resolve 
limitations issues in the courts. Given the variety of decisions, those 
drafting arbitration agreements must give thoughtful consideration to 
how the parties’ intent in an arbitration agreement will be expressed, 
particularly with respect to any threshold matter they prefer courts, 
rather than the arbitration panel, to determine.
66 Section 15 establishes a limitation of six years as an explicit procedural guideline 
for arbitration. National Association of Securities Dealers Rule 15.
